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Abstract
The impact of mitigation or control measures on an epidemics can be
estimated by fitting the parameters of a compartmental model to empir-
ical data, and running the model forward with modified parameters that
account for a specific measure. This approach has several drawbacks,
stemming from biases or lack of availability of data and instability of pa-
rameter estimates. Here we take the opposite approach – that we call
reverse epidemiology. Given the data, we reconstruct backward in time
an ensemble of networks of contacts, and we assess the impact of mea-
sures on that specific realization of the contagion process. This approach
is robust because it only depends on parameters that describe the evo-
lution of the disease within one individual (e.g. latency time) and not
on parameters that describe the spread of the epidemics in a population.
Using this method, we assess the impact of preventive quarantine on the
ongoing outbreak of Covid-19 in Italy. This gives an estimate of how
many infected could have been avoided had preventive quarantine been
enforced at a given time.
1 Introduction
The spread of a pandemic such as Covid-19 may not be contained efficiently
by social distancing measures alone [7]. At least in part, this is because social
distancing may not be possible in the household or in other circumstances (e.g.
in a hospital). In addition, lock-down of entire countries is clearly unsustainable
in the long run, for several reasons. Social distancing reduces the number of
contacts of individuals, unconditionally on their morbidity state. Preventive
quarantine is an additional measure where quarantine is applied to all the con-
tacts of an infected individual as soon as the latter is tested positive. This may
not stop contacts of the infected individual from developing the infection, but
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it closes the possibility that, if the contact develops the infection, he or she will
go on to infect further people.
This measure – also called Centralised Quarantine – has been enforced in
China [7] by establishing centralised quarantine centres, also1 for close contacts
of confirmed cases, to prevent further spread of the epidemics in case they also
turned Covid19 positive.
Ref. [7] took a model based approach to study the impact of these measures
a posteriori in the Wuhan epidemics. During the epidemics, this approach is not
feasible, because data is scarce and unreliable, and consequently estimates of
model parameters are affected by considerable uncertainty. We apply a model-
free strategy for using data available up to now (or possibly further extrapolated
with plausible scenarios) to understand how the dynamics of the epidemics
would have changed if preventive quarantine had been enforced at a particular
time in the past. The idea is that the dynamics of the epidemics can be reversed
backward, thereby constructing a probabilistic network of contagion contacts in
the population of confirmed cases. For each such reconstruction, the epidemics
can be run forward again, with preventive quarantine enforced. This provides a
picture of how much preventive quarantine would have affected the epidemics,
had it been implemented at a given time.
2 Reversed epidemics
For preventive quarantine to work, it is essential to be able to trace contacts. Let
us assume that the fraction of infected people who know by whom they have been
infected is p. For countries where contact tracing apps have been introduced,
p can be taken as a measure of the fraction of individuals that have that app
installed and active on their mobile phone. Alternatively, contact tracing can be
done by interviewing positives; a recent online survey of Spanish respondents,
suggests that p be as high as 80% on the basis of individual interviews [4].
Ferretti et al. [1] estimate that if the adoption of a contact tracing app covers
more that 70% of a population, then an epidemic with the traits of SARS-CoV-2
can be tamed.
We assume that, if A knows that B infected him/her2, then B must have
been tested positive in a previous day. We’re also going to assume that, in
this case, B also knows that he was in contact with A. With contact tracing
apps, these are reasonable assumptions, otherwise this may be reasonable if the
relationship between A and B is a significant one.
Let It the set of new positives at time t. Let Pt ⊆ It be the subset of
infected at time t that know by whom they were infected. For each individual
i ∈ Pt we can simulate her previous history of contagion: she got infective
1Contacts of positive cases and symptomatic cases were quarantined in different facilities
[7].
2By this we mean that A knows the identity of B. This does not count cases as, for example,
when A knows that s/he has been infected by a client of the grocery shop he/she visited. It
is unclear whether the figure of 80% reported in [4] includes such cases or not
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(with or without symptoms) at time t − Ti and the contact that passed them
the infection occurred at time t − Ti − Li, where Ti, Li = 1, 2, . . . are times of
infection and latency and can be drawn from a distribution3. There is ample
converging evidence on the expected values of Ti and Li for Covid-19 (see [5]
for a review), and also their distribution has been estimated from data [2]. We
assume that all those tested positive at time t do not infect others at time t
or at later times, i.e. they are immediately quarantined (or hospitalised). This
may not be true in reality.
From a time series of positive new cases, we can reconstruct at each time
τ ≤ t a population Cτ of contacts, which is the set of people that got infected at
time τ , and the population of Eτ of infective, but not yet detected, individuals.
Eτ contains all those individuals for which ti − Ti ≤ τ < ti, where ti is the time
where i was tested positive. For each i ∈ Cτ we can draw at random a link
(i.e. a contagion event) to a j ∈ Eτ and reconstruct the contact network at time
τ . This construction4 gives a possible history of how the contagion has spread
up to time t. For all i ∈ Eτ we define ∂i,τ as the set of all j ∈ Cτ that were
infected by i at time τ . It is important to remark that this is only a plausible
history of the contagion; nevertheless, if the statistics of the latency/ detection
times and traceability are reasonable, we expect that conclusions drawn from
multiple simulated histories will provide a faithful representation of the average
behaviour of the epidemic.
Now let us assume that at time tpq a preventive quarantine measure is put
in place. This implies that all individuals that got in contacts of all i ∈ Iτ since
τ − tQ are isolated (with tQ = 14 days). We generate a set Qτ that contains all
individuals in quarantine
Qτ = Qτ−1
⋃ ⋃
i∈Pτ
τ⋃
τ ′=τ−tQ
∂i,τ ′
 . (1)
In words, Qτ contains all individuals in quarantine the day before, plus all those
that where in contact with all i ∈ Pτ in the previous tQ. Notice there is no need
to remove people from Qτ , since we’re considering only positives that stay in
quarantine until they become negative.
As a consequence all contagion events involving i ∈ Qτ are eliminated. After
this is done, the network of contagion is reconstructed on all the remaining
contagion events, a new population PQτ is reconstructed.
3Uppercase letters are used for random variables.
4This corresponds to sampling the maximum entropy ensemble of contact networks consis-
tent with the data. This is appropriate in the absence of further information on the statistics
of contacts. The approach can be refined to include additional information on contact distri-
butions.
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3 Results
The result of the reconstruction5 of the epidemics is shown in Figure 1. Data
from Friuli Venezia Giulia (FVG) and Veneto regions are compared to what
would have happened on average if preventive quarantine had been enforced
on March 18th (day 24). We extend the data up to April 5th with a possible
scenario of how the epidemics may evolve under a slowly varying downward
trend 6. This sheds light on the effects of preventive quarantine on a longer
timescale. We assumed a geometric distribution for the distributions of Ti and
Li, with E[Ti] = 3 and E[Li] = 5.
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Figure 1: Top: New positive Covid-19 cases (black lines) for the FVG (top
left) and Veneto (top right) regions. The data up to April 4th (vertical line at
day 41) is continued by simulating a possible scenario. This dataset is com-
pared with the new positives under a preventive quarantine measure (p = 0.8)
enforced on March 18th (vertical line at day 24) in 100 independent runs of
the reconstructed epidemics (green dots). Averages are reported as red lines.
Bottom left: Average new positives in 100 runs of he reconstructed epidemics
with preventive quarantine for different values of p for the FVG Region. Bottom
right: Fraction of the new positives that should be dealt with with preventive
quarantine for different values of p for the Veneto Region.
After sufficient time, the ratio between the predicted new positives under
5The code used for the simulations is available under request at marsili@ictp.it.
6Notice that these are not predictions; they are simply illustrative of a possible forward
history of the epidemic and the relative effect that preventative quarantine would have.
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preventive quarantine and the observed ones approach a constant. The value
of this proportion can be easily calculated by considering that new cases under
preventive quarantine are possible only if a person does not know by whom
was infected (event that happens with probability p) or if she knows that was
infected by someone who was not under preventive quarantine (which happens
with probability p(1 − p)). For large times the ratio of new positive with and
without preventive quarantine tends to 1− p2.
4 Discussion
There are a number of aspects worth mentioning:
• Individuals i ∈ Iτ/Pτ who don’t know whom they’ve been infected by are
not removed. This is a clear incentive for adopting apps at individual level.
We assume that individuals who don’t know whom they are infected by,
are infected by individuals that do not belong to the population of detected
positives.
• We assume that if i knows that he/she was infected by j then j knows, at
the time of being tested positive, that he/she had a contact with i. This
may not be true based on questionnaire, but it is reasonable if apps for
contact tracing are adopted.
• The set Qτ only includes positives in quarantine. It does not include those
who got in contact with a positive case, but who were not infected. So the
set of quarantined people should be much larger. Ten times the number
of positives may be a a conservative measure.
• The reverse epidemics approach relies on parameters of the infection dy-
namics (the distributions of Ti and Li) that have been estimated empir-
ically [7, 5]. In particular, the approach is independent of the infection
rate, percentage of asymptomatic cases and other parameters that make
predictions on the basis of forward epidemiological models very unstable.
• Effects of preventive quarantine are weak in the first week (see Fig. 1)
due to the lags related to incubation period and detection. A significant
effect is apparent by the end of the second week. The full effect sets in
after the third week.
• The effects of preventive quarantine depend strongly on p, the efficiency
with which contacts are monitored. An efficiency p = 0.8 in tracing con-
tacts, that according to a recent study should be achievable by interview-
ing positive cases [4], can reduce the size of the epidemics by 60%. An
efficiency of 95%, such as that reported by Wang at al. [7] for Wuhan, can
reduce almost to 10% of what they would have been. If mobile apps will
be adopted the level of compliance of users will be critical to ensure that
preventive quarantine is effective.
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• Our analysis permits us to estimate the effects of preventive quarantine
on the tested positive population in a counterfactual scenario. In reality,
preventive quarantine would also isolate many infected individuals who
would not go on to develop symptoms (and hence would be unlikely to
be tested) but who would contribute to further spread the disease. The
isolation of non-tested individuals would contribute, in the most optimistic
scenario, to a reduction of basic reproductive number of a factor 1− p2, if
all the contacts between people that know who they were infected by are
eliminated. This optimistic reduction of the basic reproductive number
would correspond to an exponential decrease of the ratio between new
cases with and without preventive quarantine. The protective potential
of preventive quarantine might be therefore between this latter optimistic
scenario and the more pessimistic one that we discussed in this paper and
illustrated in Figure 4.
The reverse epidemiology approach bears similarity with the reconstruction
of phylogeny from generic data (see e.g. [3]) and the counterfactual analysis of
disruption events in other complex systems (see e.g. [6]). We are not aware of
any such approach to the study of epidemic outbreaks, which we believe is a
very promising one.
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